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University Devolution: How and why American
research universities are becoming even more tribal1

John Aubrey Douglass∗

Introduction
In the wake of the Cold War, America’s research universities became
increasingly characterized by a tribal mentality among schools and departments,
and disciplines. The surge in research funding, and the tremendous growth rate
among the major public universities in particular, fostered the idea of the
“multiversity”: universities become less communal and less aware of their
collective purpose. These patterns have accelerated over the past two decades
in the US reflecting two relatively new realities or influences:
• Within the public university sector, decreasing public subsidies have
influenced a movement toward internal management decisions and
organization forms that have eroded a previous model of revenue sharing
(in tuition and fees, in overhead generated by extramural research, for
example) and strengthened an approach more focused on profit, loss, and
prestige centers.
• This has been accompanied and reinforced by the concept that there are
different market opportunities among different schools, departments,
disciplines and their degrees and other services, and hence opportunity
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costs (in the tuition price of an MBA versus an English PhD, for example)
in which high income units increasingly seek to retain these monies.
This paper explores the development and impact of these various influences
on research intensive universities, with the theme that the internal concept of the
university is rapidly changing, influencing the behavior of academic leaders and
faculty, the organization of the post-modern university, the flow of funds, and
ultimately the perceived and real role of the research university in society. Past
observers of the life and times on universities have described aspects of this shift
as a movement from a larger sense of a university community among faculty to a
tribal mentality. But the current shift extends well beyond the weakening of
disciplines and departments, beyond faculty as individual actors, to the internal
organization of the academy and a relatively new concept of profit and loss
centers.
This shift toward what I call “University Devolution” or fragmentation is
influenced by the external political, social, and economic world. In Europe and
elsewhere, neo-liberal ministries wield great power and have helped pushed
universities toward this model. In the US, it remains largely a phenomenon
influenced by reduced government investment yet ultimately driven by internal
decision-making related to privatization – thus far. The paper ends with a brief
discussion on whether the organizational behaviors in US research universities
are reflective of global trends, or are in some aspects unique.
Describing contemporary trends as “Devolution” is intentionally pejorative
– used to describe a process that distracts institutions from their collective
strength and coherency. They are becoming, it seems, less then the sum of their
parts. However, such fragmentation might also be portrayed as a natural
progression or evolutionary tale in which market forces and the relevancy of
individual faculty and programs create greater operational differentiation within
and among universities. And in Europe, where both ministries of education and
an often recalcitrant faculty have made effective management of universities
extremely difficult (Ritzen, 2010), Devolution has other and more positives
meanings. But here I focus largely on the story of US higher education, past
and future.

Context and megatrends – Follow the money
The governance and management organizations in higher education reflect
real world trends and changes in the funding and political environment in which
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they exist. In the case of universities in the US, and elsewhere, recent
organizational behavior is also influenced by often long-standing practices and
by the structure of authority – e.g., who has budget and personnel power, a
governing board, a president or rector, the faculty, or a government ministry.
America was the first nation to develop a mass higher education system,
starting in earnest in the mid-1800 with the establishment of a group of
“Land-Grant Universities.” While initially supported by federal legislation in
the form of granting swaths of federal land to states to use for supporting or
establishing universities with public purposes, the authority to create and manage
new higher education institutions lay with state governments. Under the US
constitution, states have this authority. As a result, there is no Ministry of
Education at the national level prevalent in most parts of the world with the
primary authority in setting policy and shaping the governance and management
practices of their respective universities.
In turn, state governments in the US provided significant levels of
autonomy for both their publicly funded universities along with their collection
of private universities. While different in their missions and in their levels of
accountability, both public and private institutions reflect a corporate model in
which state governments create charters approving establishment of a university
(or college) and in the case of public institutions outline a structure of
governance that include a “lay” governing board (a body with representatives
largely from the larger state community they are intended to serve). In turn, the
board appoints a president (sometimes called a Chancellor), hires or fires that
person (they serve at the discretion of the board), and provides them with
significant management authority including the selection of major academic
positions and budgetary decisions. To varying degrees depending on the
institutions, faculty are generally delegated authority in issues related to the
academic side of the house, including what is taught and who teaches (a shared
responsibility with academic administrators who have authority for budgets).
I outline these basic characteristics of the US model to help provide context
for the following discussion on changing organizational behaviors of universities.
Up until the 1960s, and particularly between the end of World War II and 1970,
much of the attention of state governments and higher education leaders in the
public sphere was on how to grow enrollment, programs, and the number of
faculty. It also included creating greater coherency in the network of colleges
and universities in a state – essentially building systems of higher education that
placed public institutions (and sometime absorbing private ones) under a single
governing board. This required relatively robust and consistent new public
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investment in higher education by state governments. Federal investment was,
and remains, largely focused on providing student aid to individual students
based on financial need and on funding basic and applied research – with
tremendous investments after the startling launch of Sputnik in 1957.
Again with varying degrees of autonomy and controls on the use of public
monies, most public universities – where the vast majority enrollment program
growth occurred over the past seventy years – could count on a steady flow of
public investment. Leaving aside federal research funding, there were
relatively few other major sources of income. Tuition and fees, for example, in
virtually all public institutions, be it a community college or a research intensive
university, were extremely low in the 1960s. The historical development of the
corporate model and the high levels of public investment led to what might be
termed an “organizational structure and culture of growth.” This included:
• A positive academic milieu around building new academic programs and
new facilities.
• Relatively low and stable student to faculty ratios.
• Common faculty salary scales across the disciplines.
• Faculty and staff compensation levels that provided for middle-class status
and relatively high rates of home ownership, health care coverage, and
robust retirement provisions for retirement.
• Relatively high percentages of tenure track faculty versus non-tenured (in
US parlance “lecturers”).
• Development of a relatively new cadre of support staff related to the
growing basic research enterprise, new regulatory controls largely from the
federal government, and a growing array of student services.
• Arrival of other new support staff in areas such as student services.
• Adherence to the concept of revenue sharing in which funds were placed
where there was a sense of greatest need as opposed to allocating
proportionately according to actual revenue generation (e.g., in funding
per-student or research overhead monies from a particular department or
school).
• These and other factors led to a stronger sense of community among
academics and their administrative leadership – although tested at times by
social strife including protests related to the civil rights and anti-war
movements.
This era is often called the “Golden Age” for American higher education.
Building programs and sometimes new campuses, and with adequate financial
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support, obviously creates different organizational behaviors and dynamics than
retrenchment and disinvestment. In addition, there was a sense of stability
created by relatively consistent public investment in higher education by state
governments and, for the research university sector, new and consistently
increasing federal funding for basic research justified to a large degree on the
space race and the Cold War. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the
subsequent surge in funding support from Washington for research in science
and emerging technologies, along with continued state investment to grow
programs and enrollment capacity, seemed to portend lasting financial stability
for American higher education.

Source: Trends in College Pricing 2011, College Board (2011).

Figure 1. Average State Appropriations for Higher Education per $1,000 in
Personal Income, 1990-91 to 2010-11

But the political and budgetary conditions that supported this environment
had begun to change by the late 1960s. Among the major megatrends (focusing
on public higher education, where some 80 per cent of all student are enrolled):
• The beginning of a long-term decline in public investment in public higher
education relative to personal income and on a per-student basis. While
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the US population grew, and demand grew for higher education,
universities increasingly had to, as they say, ‘do more with less’ (see Figure
1). This is a nationwide phenomenon, but has become more pronounced
over the past decade, and more significant in a number of the states with the
largest populations and with the greatest dependency on public higher
education, such as California, Texas, and Florida.
• In turn, this has led to increasing reliance on tuition and fees, but not at
rates that can make up for lost per-student income from public coffers.
Figure 2 provides percentage changes in state appropriations for higher
education versus tuition and fees since 1979, and illustrates the general
inverse relationship.
• Decreased public investment and the volatility in funding from state
governments created a new (and more difficult) environment for university
management and resource allocation.

Source: Trends in College Pricing 2011, College Board (2011).

Figure 2. Annual Percentage Changes in State Appropriations for Higher
Education per Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Student and Changes in
Inflation-adjusted Tuition and Fees at Public Four-Year Institutions,
1980̂81 to 2010̂11
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This new environment led to a number of efforts to reduce operating and
capital costs. Higher education is a labor-intensive sector of the economy,
essentially composed of highly trained professionals. The most effective way
to reduce operating costs is to increase faculty workload – essentially by
increasing student to faculty ratios – and by changing the composition of the
instructional staff.
In 1960, 75 per cent of college instructors were full-time tenured or
tenure-track professors. In 1975, they represented about 57 per cent of all
instructional staff in American higher education. By 2007, they represented a
mere 31 per cent of the total, with part-time faculty over 50 per cent of the
instructional staff (see Figure 4). More recent data indicates the trend
accelerated with the onset of the Great Recession that began in 2008. Faculty
members serving in ‘contingent’ or short-term appointments now make up more
than 75 per cent of the total instructional staff, with the most rapid growth being
in part-time faculty members.
The growth of “adjunct” faculty (part-time, short term contracts) is a
phenomenon most prevalent at the community college level, but very significant
among major research universities as well, both public and private. For
example, at New York University (a private institution gaining in national and
world rankings over the past three decades) adjuncts teach some 70 per cent of
all undergraduate courses taught. In turn, this allows for lower teaching
workload for tenured or tenured tracked faculty. And while in 1960 most
faculty had similar teaching workloads across the majority of disciplines,
perhaps around five courses a year in a semester system, there are now growing
differences.
Another indicator of change is the radical shift in the composition of
personnel at major research universities – including administrators and support
positions in areas such as student affairs, and administrative assistants for
research projects. The University of California (UC) provides an example. It
is a research-intensive university system with ten campuses, including one
medical school campus (UC San Francisco).
Figure 5 provides data on all personnel at the UC, with the exception of
staff at the various hospitals run by many of the campuses. It shows in
dramatic fashion two major trends. The first is the huge scale in growth in the
number of both faculty and administrators, which in part reflects overall growth
in enrollment, in programs, and in the complexity of the modern research
university.
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Source: Statistical Summary of Students and Staff, University of California, Annual publication
1958 – 2012.

Figure 5. University of California Faculty and Staff: 1958 - 2011

When Clark Kerr wrote his famous essay in 1963 on the “multiversity”
which described the growing functions and roles of universities, and the
increased decentralization of the institution into numerous communities with
numerous constituencies, it was a contemporary account (Kerr, 2001). As
indicated by these staff numbers, the shear scale of the enterprise today might
best be described as the ‘mega-university’ – so large and complex as to defy easy
definition although I will return to this issue later.
The second trend is the growth in support staff positions relative to faculty
hires and retentions. The faculty to administrators/support staff ratio in 1958
was 1 to 0.53; by 1996 it had grown to 1 to 2.4. After the Great Recession, and
despite cuts in administrative staff and limits on faculty hiring, by 2011 the ratio
declined marginally to 1 to 2.1.
What does this type of data indicate? One assumption, popular among
faculty, is that it indicates huge bureaucratic growth.
There have been significant increases in staffing related to the growth in
student services – including everything from career counseling, health programs,
housing offices, job placement staff, tutoring programs, community volunteer
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units, ombudsman’s offices, and various opportunities for athletic pursuits.
This American university phenomenon, in which the university increasingly
takes responsibility for a student’s life and guides their activities, reflects a
tradition rooted in the idea of in loco parentis (Latin for “in the place of a
parent”). But it accelerated considerably in the late 1960s and into the 1970s.
At the same time, federal mandates and funds for higher education also
grew mightily in that same decade. This included funds for programs to recruit
and support minority and underserved student populations, along with reporting
requirements that required additional institutional research staff. Universities
established new administrative positions at the vice president or chancellor level
to oversee a growing number of sub-population specific programs at a time of
large-scale enrollment growth.
Yet also an important influence on the growth in support and administrative
staff was the activities of faculty. In the sciences and in engineering, research
increasingly required teams of graduate and postdoctoral students, along with
support staff, and new centers and institutes were created in all the disciplines.
Federal regulations related to research also spawned administrative workload
including new budgetary reporting requirements and Institutional Review Boards
that oversaw medical studies and experiments that included human subjects.
Personnel data on UC shown in Figure 5 also includes medical faculty and
staff, where there has been a large-scale increase in people and expertise.
Combined, a story emerges of a significantly changed environment and
organization, but with the greatest change during the period 1965 to 1996, and
more marginal growth after that perhaps reflecting budgetary constraints and
rising student to faculty ratios.

A new “Devolutionary” world
Much of the analysis on the management behaviors of research universities
in the US since the 1960s has focused on a series of efforts by university leaders
to adapt ideas and management theory to the practice of running a campus. As
state governments began to fluctuate in their funding support for public higher
education, leading to a general decline in per-student funding when adjusted for
inflation, universities looked for improved business practices and were told by
politicians and business interests alike to adopt private sector management
techniques.
The history of American higher education is full of examples of business
interests influencing university management and operations. Thorsten Veblen

John Aubrey Douglass

23

famously complained in 1918 that captains of industry were infiltrating the lay
boards of universities and demanding utilitarian goals and programs. They
were considered a threat to the values of free inquiry and the ideals of a liberal
education. To a degree generally not found in other parts of the world,
American universities, and in particular public institutions, where established in
part to help develop local economies.
But after a period of innovation in the early part of the 20th century,
influenced by the public administration movement (in part develop by
universities and influenced in reaction to Taylorism and similar efficiency
movements), management practices in universities, including resource allocation,
tended to be largely removed from changing management norms and fads found
in the private sector.
As noted, revenue – whether in the form of public funding, tuition and fees,
or what was until the 1960s rather meager income from endowments in both the
public and private universities – tended to be distributed relatively equitably and
related to student workload. Beginning in 1958, increased federal research
funding was accompanied by overhead rates established to cover the
administrative and facilities cost, often used as a source of revenue sharing
(Baldridge, 1971; Birnbaum, 1989). Faculty salaries were largely similar
across the disciplines (Finkelstein & Schuster, 2008).
Two factors changed this dynamic:
• First, the transition of an academic culture that moved from a broad sense
of being part of a campus community to increasingly tribal mentality,
connected more explicitly to colleagues in research subfields in other
institutions.
• Second, in the case of public universities, responses to declining public
investment and changes in the academic culture helped launch new
approaches to resource allocation and university management.
Academic culture
It was a trend already in the making when Clark Kerr noted in 1963 that the
modern research university had become not one but multiple academic
communities. Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, both sociologists, added
to this notion with their 1968 book The Academic Revolution, stating that the
academy had been a parochial world, but was moving away from campus
loyalties to that of their profession – and more specifically to affinities with
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colleagues in the same discipline (Jencks & Riesman, 1968). Tony Becher
coined the term “academic tribes” each with their “traditions, customs and
practices, transmitting knowledge, beliefs, morals and rules of conduct, as well
as their linguistic and symbolic forms of communication and meanings they
share” (Becher, 1989). Others writing on academic culture have described the
effects of specialization and the increased pressure for faculty to produce
research (Boyer, 1990; Rosovsky, 1992; Massy & Zemsky, 1992).
Since then, it is widely understood that the shift away from the affinity with
a campus (the employer of faculty) has devolved (or evolved, depending on your
view) further to a much more finite group of sub-disciplines and specialties.
This has been accelerated by three factors:
• Huge growth in the higher education sector in enrollment and programs that
create different dynamics and reinforces specialization – creating a critical
mass of people in sub-fields, but usually in other institutions often dispersed
throughout the world. In 1950, there were 2.3 million students in higher
education in the US; by 1970 their numbers grew to 8.6 million, and by
2010 21.1 million (see Figure 6). At the same time, and as elaborated by
Neil Smelser and building on the notion of the multiversity, research
universities have continuously added to their portfolio of activities – some
in response to societal desires and demands, some related to an internal
culture that seeks to expand the frontiers of knowledge. Smelser calls this
structural accretion, what he defines as “the continued addition of new
functions and structures without shedding old ones.” (Smelser, 2012).
Universities are in the business of growing, if not in students then in
programs and fields. There is steady growth in science and engineering
occupations, including academics, in the US workforce. The rapid
expansion of knowledge production in all fields, but particularly in the
sciences where funding for basic research has grown dramatically since
1958. Figure 7 illustrates joint authorships between faculty and colleagues
abroad – one example of the increasingly global nature of academic
networks.
• An information and communication technology revolution that facilitates
new academic, professional and social networks both domestic and
international.
• Increased university interaction with the private sector and the process of
technology transfer that has enlarged or reshaped faculty and student
interaction.
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Management/Continuous Quality Improvement (TQM/CQI), Business Process
Reengineering (BPR) and Benchmarking. As noted by one early critic, these
“fads” may “arrive at higher education’s doorstep five years after their trial in
business, often just as corporations are discarding them” (Marchese, 1991, p.7).
Ultimately, the largest effect of these various management techniques was
seemingly marginal and largely provided temporal influences on the business
practices of universities, including functions such as accounting and payroll, and
accountability frameworks, predominantly for the non-academic activities of the
burgeoning research universities. On the academic side, greater influences
were at play reflecting market forces, and where and how resources were
allocated. In this view, the adoption of various management practices, like
Zero-Based Budgeting financing, were more reactions to realities on the ground
than to grand efforts to reshape the behaviors of faculty and an increasingly
powerful sub-group of departments and schools. This includes the following
old and relatively new trends – what might be viewed as acceleration in the tribal
character of major US research-intensive universities:
• Increased costs for developing robust science and engineering programs.
• A correlating increase in the influence of faculty and academic leaders in
science and engineering fields on resource allocation and setting the
priorities of institutions.
• Elevated competition for top faculty with unequal payroll and start-up costs
(laboratory equipment, housing assistance etc.) among the disciplines.
• The development of large disparities in faculty salaries among the
disciplines and professional fields.
• Increased focus on academic profit and loss, and prestige centers –
essentially academic departments and schools that generate profits via
tuition income, research revenues, and gifts and endowments versus
programs that either “lose” money or break even.
• Movements toward differential fees among degree programs that reflect
perceived market price opportunity and largely divorced from actual
program costs. Figure 8 provides an example of differential fees among a
select group of thirty public and private universities in 2007 – before the
Great Recession – and increased tuition and fees imposed by public
universities (Douglass & Sobotka, 2009).
• Growing differences in the academic experience of students with the
growth in curricular requirements demanded by the various disciplines
despite the American concept of General Education, contributing further to
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the development of different academic cultures (Brint, Cantwell &
Hannerman, 2008).

Source: Douglass and Sobotka, “The Big Curve,” 2009.

Figure 8. U.S. Universities Sample Group of Differential Tuition and Fees 2007

The following provides a few case studies that help illustrate aspects of this
Devolution or fragmentation.

The unraveling of faculty ladder
The success of the UC as one of the top research institutions in the world is
part due to an early devotion to a peer review process for faculty hiring and
advancement. In the immediate period following World War II, faculty
positions were categorized in the traditional ranges of Assistant Professor (the
normal entry position with a period of approximately five years before granting
tenure), Associate Professor, and Professor. Within each title, five to six “steps”
set salary scales. UC has long had a system of “post-tenure” review.
This meant that a department chair and its dean submit a recommendation
for a faculty member to be reviewed on their research productivity, teaching
record, and contribution to public service. At each of the three professorial
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positions, faculty were to provide evidence and gain support via a faculty driven
process of review, with escalating expectations to reach the status of a full
professor title. This is in contrast to a civil service approach to advancement,
primarily determined by time on the job, common among many non-research
intensive universities in the US and in much of the world.
A similar structure of Assistant, Associate, and full Professor, with a period
and process of evaluation of merit required for advancement, can be found in
other major public research universities in the US, although very few have such
a detailed step system and such a rigorous post-tenure review process. The
main difference today from earlier eras of university development is that up to
1968 all faculty in all disciplines and professional fields had the same salary
levels, with the exception of health sciences. In the growth eras of the 1950s
and 1960s, in which the ranks of faculty grew tremendously fast, the majority
were hired at the level of Assistant Professor Step 1. And while some faculty in
the course of their academic career gained offers from other universities and left,
faculty mobility was relatively low. Most faculty tended to make the campus
they were first hired at their permanent home.
Within the UC system, this created a relatively stable environment for
resource allocations for faculty positions and salary levels. It also led to a sense
of equity for advancement, and common expectations of required course
workload among faculty – although with some differences between the sciences,
and the social sciences and humanities.
But three factors are currently eroding the faculty ladder at UC. First, the
market for faculty has changed significantly depending on field and expertise.
In the UC system, in 1968 law was the first professional field outside of
medicine that sought and gained its own faculty salary scale, with higher salaries.
It’s a familiar argument: to attract talent to the field, law schools needed to offer
salaries similar or at approaching those found in the private sector. Business
and engineering schools soon gained their own faculty ladder. With a very
different stream of income via clinical services, the salary of medical faculty also
began to diverge even more significantly from other faculty.
Thus far, large differences in the salary scales of faculty at major research
universities, like UC, have been in professional programs – business,
engineering, law, medicine. But there are indicators that other departments and
schools, particularly in the sciences, may soon claim the need for special salary
scales. So far, however, the path to higher salaries is linked to the second
factor: decreased public investment in higher education, which has depressed
faculty salaries. Faculty salary increases have not kept up with inflation or with
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a group of comparative private institutions in which UC campuses such as
Berkeley must compete. As a result, departments gain approval to hire new
faculty at elevated steps: hence, a young faculty member in a hot field of
research in the social sciences, for example, might be offered an Assistant
Professor position at an off-scale salary at Step 3, or sometimes at Step 5, or
higher.
A third and related factor eroding the concept of a uniform faculty ladder at
UC is the increased demand and costs for academic stars, many of whom
demand low teaching workloads and other special privileges and resources.
“Teaching loads have dropped significantly in engineering and the natural
sciences during my career,” notes Karl Pister (personal communication, January
15, 2012), a long-time faculty member in civil engineering at Berkeley and a
former Chancellor at UC Santa Cruz. In the sciences, faculty hires are also
determined by promises of precious lab space and investments for equipment
and graduate students. In contrast to, for example, 1960, major research
universities are spending resources searching for top faculty talent often at the
mid-career and senior level where faculty mobility is much higher today, and
more international, than in earlier eras.
Business schools going it alone – The Darden Business School
In 2003, the Darden Business School at the University of Virginia (UVa)
became a formally “self-sufficient” unit. UVa would still confer degrees, but
the financial and most other aspects of operating Darden were devolved to the
School. In negotiations that included the University’s President and lawmakers,
this unprecedented level of autonomy was granted based on the argument that
Darden could not compete with other major business schools without greater
authority to charge market tuition rates previously regulated by state government,
and to set attractive salary rates for faculty (Kirp, 2003).
As noted, business schools, as well as continuing education programs, have
been at the forefront in the US and internationally in gaining differential fees and
in developing and marketing targeted degree and credential programs –
specifically executive MBAs – with high profit margins. This revenue, plus a
plan to increase extramural fund raising and development of a much larger
endowment, would create the basis for meeting the escalating costs of
competition with perceived peer business schools. At the same time, business
schools across the nation had been striking deals with their university
administrations to also keep more of the rising tuition rates they charged.
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The model in 1960 was that fees were uniform, they went to a centralized
pool and were redistributed in a fashion that supported – relatively equally – the
breadth of academic programs thought required for a comprehensive university.
In public universities with long histories of serving local and state labor needs,
this often included degree and credential programs that were more expensive
than others, and in which student demand was conditioned by tuition and fee
costs, and yet where the social good was considered high, as in nursing. As
noted, a revenue sharing scheme was intended to support a comprehensive
university.
The new model, largely forged by business schools, was to keep as much
tuition revenue as possible. With the new model at UVa, Darden’s Dean, Ted
Snyder, negotiated what he termed a university “tax” on tuition revenue charged
by the school to a mere 10 per cent. At the time, other major business schools
had cut deals for higher central tax rates: the University of Michigan’s business
school paid 24 per cent of tuition revenue to the university; at Emory, a private
university, the rate was 40 per cent. Snyder had first considered proposing a
rate of 5 per cent, but he was looking for a number that would help mitigate
expected resistance by other deans at UVa.
Built on the brand-name of UVa, and after decades of investment under the
revenue sharing principle, Darden essentially became a separate corporation, and
it has since prospered – gaining in reputation, and with a new campus that
reflects the high-end look and feel necessary for charging top dollar for an MBA
and executive programs. Darden also provides an example of decision-making
in which deals are struck, often under circumstances of financial stress of a
university, which then become precedent. There is no turning back. The
success of the Dean and faculty at Darden also provided a high profile example
for other business schools, along with law schools, further accelerating the
devolution pattern not just in the US, but internationally.
In part influenced by the success of Darden, UVa announced recently that it
is moving toward a decentralized internal finance model that vests responsibility
for revenues and expenses with individual schools and colleges rather than the
university as a whole, a move designed to drive deans to find additional revenue
streams and operate their units more efficiently – a management approach
sometimes referred to as “every tub on its own bottom” management, with
influential versions at Harvard and the University of Southern California, and an
earlier and failed attempt at UC Los Angeles. It is devolution with
social-Darwinian effects: individual units such as schools or colleges keep most
of the money they bring in, but must also pay whatever expenses they incur.
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They swim or sink with at least one anticipated result: loss centers may not
survive.
A law school privatizes and takes on debt
In 2005 Chris Edley, the Dean of UC Berkeley’s famed Boalt Hall School
of Law wanted additional revenue to compete for high-profile faculty and
upgrade buildings that seemed stuck in the early 1970s or before. Coming from
Harvard’s law school, with its significant wealth, to Berkeley was perhaps a bit
of a shock. Edley proposed that Boalt be allowed to match the fees charged at
the University of Michigan, an institution like UVa at the vanguard of the public
university privatization movement – what can be defined as less government
funding, more institutional autonomy, greater authority to raise tuition rates,
charging both in-state and out-of-state/international students the same rate, and
greater freedom on how the income is allocated. State funding had faded from
60 per cent of Boalt’s budget in 1994 to 30 per cent in 2005. The decline had
been largely mitigated by higher tuition: offering differential fees since the early
1990s, in 2005 California residents paid just under $22,000 a year to attend the
law school, about double the rate four years earlier. Annual out-of-state tuition
was nearly $34,000 – creating increased incentives to recruit (Hong, 2005).
The UC system (a network of ten highly ranked research universities) had a
proposal before its Board of Regents for a 5 per cent increase for all professional
schools – an attempt to maintain uniformity in fee levels, with the exception of
the already largely independent business schools. But Edley argued before the
Regents that: “We’re not narrowing the gap. The gap will continue to widen
and that seems to be to me fundamentally unacceptable.” It was “a prescription,
for in the long run ... a second-rate law school” (Kawaguchi, 2005). A failure
to raise tuition rates would be a huge lost opportunity, Edley explained. To
mitigate the impact on students from lower-economic families, Boalt’s plan
included redistributing a portion of the increased tuition income to financial aid.
The Regents approved the proposal. Edley had also cut a deal with UC
Berkeley’s chancellor whereby Boalt would keep most of the new revenue,
reflecting similar deals at UVa and the University of Michigan. A year earlier,
and shortly after arriving from Harvard, Edley announced a campaign to raise
$100 million. It was a staggering sum for Boalt; the school’s last capital
campaign wrapped up in 1992 after raising only $14 million.
Adding to Boalt’s story was a subsequent shortfall in the fund raising
campaign along with significantly rising operating expenses deemed necessary
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for maintaining Boalt’s status as a top law school. Edley and Berkeley campus
officials assumed large increases in extramural revenue when it began a building
and renovation plan initially projected to cost $60 million. But shortly before
construction was to begin, it was realized that fund raising in the midst of the
Great Recession was not going to fully cover the rising costs for the project, by
then estimated at $90 million. With no other source of funding available, the
Dean and Nathan Brostrom, the new Vice Chancellor for Administration and a
former executive at JPMorgan, developed a proposal to gain a large loan from
private creditors with the collateral based on future tuition income. Brostrom
drew on his knowledge of corporate financing to help develop what was, up to
then, an unusual proposal.
Returning to the Board of Regents, the Berkeley campus first requested an
increase in Boalt Hall’s tuition by about 19 per cent and then returned again to
the Board with a proposal for a $84.2 million external loan with debt service
paid by fee income, and $5.8 million from Boalt’s fund raising campaign. It
was estimated that some $5.95 million a year of future tuition income would
cover the debt service of the loan (UC Board of Regents, 2008).
The Regents approved the proposal and by the beginning of 2012 the
capital project had been nearly completed, significantly enhancing Boalt’s
facilities and allowing for marginal increases in enrollment. This was the first
such deal made at the University of California, although there are perhaps
similar ventures by professional schools in other major universities. It
represents simply an additional wrinkle in the path toward devolution, in which
resources are increasingly localized in profit and prestige units. Such deals are
likely a growing model in US public universities.

A global trend?
Boalt Hall, the Darden Business School, and the unraveling of faculty
salary ladder or scales at the UC are a sampling of various behaviors rooted in
financial challenges and the changing market for degree programs and for faculty.
While beyond the scope of this brief study, there are other behaviors that would
also be informative to explore. These include a relatively new “re-charge”
culture, or what is sometimes call Responsibility Centered Management, in
which goods and services previously offered by the university at no direct cost
are now being itemized and charged, supposedly at cost, but one might surmise
sometimes inflated as units strive to create surpluses. Another is the effect of a
growing regulatory regime linked not only to federal and state mandates, but also
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to internal auditing and growing bureaucracies. And yet another variable
involves the organizational behaviors shaped by America’s litigious society and
by increased rights granted to employees of universities. Although difficult to
measure, these are growing influences on the university environment – some
good, some bad.
Is the process of Devolution a particularly American phenomenon?
Perhaps the strong sense of community once prevalent in campuses, reinforced
by budget allocations and by the sense of collective effort in expanding academic
programs and growing enrollment, was a relatively unique American
phenomenon (Douglass, 2007). The sense of loss, or regression into a more
fragmented academic milieu, may therefore be more pronounced; perhaps it
never really existed in many other nations, where the primacy of the department
or faculties in various fields has been more significant, reinforced to some
degree by the lack of general education requirements which spread course
workload, and funding, among the academic fields. In Japan, for instance, the
supremacy of faculty and their departments and schools, has long ruled,
seemingly impervious to campus wide coordination or even government policy
initiatives.
Under a plan to expand the authority of the presidents of the elite national
universities, Japan’s Ministry of Education changed the status of these
institutions as corporate entities using a familiar formula: give the university and
its academic leader more autonomy but with the burden of a greater
accountability regime. But all evidence is that there has been no major shift in
authority or power internally – thus far. One sees similar ministerial efforts to
empower the academic heads of French and German universities. As Georg
Kruecken has observed, “The university as an organization is transforming into
an organizational actor, i.e. an integrated, goal-oriented, and competitive entity
in which management and leadership play an ever more important role.”
(Kruecken, 2011, p.X). This seems to point to greater centralization of
authority and perhaps the promise of greater cohesion within university
communities, even if one result is the infiltration of private sector acumen about
budgets and operations that some may not find completely admirable.
There is a significant and growing literature beyond the initial studies by
Jencks and Riesman (1968), and Becher (1989) that focused on the American
scene, and which now includes international comparative perspectives
(Kruecken & Meier, 2006; Musselin, 2009; Olsen, 2007; Scott, 2010). There
are distinct experiences and viewpoint between the Americana and European
experience in building mass higher education. In Europe, the power and
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influence of central governments have shaped organizational behavior.
Historically, they have not had the same sense of their role as agents of economic
development and socio-economic mobility. In the viewpoint of European
critiques, for example, an “academic oligarchy” of faculty narrowly concerned
about their research ruled the day and only recently has succumbed to a numbing
series of edicts from government to drag it closer to the “market” (Clark, 1998;
Ritzen, 2010). This is a story line that simply does not apply to America’s
public universities, that have always had ‘in their DNA’ the idea of promoting
socio-economic mobility and economic development as part of their public
mission and portfolio.
At the same time, however, some of the elements of the Devolution story
are common, found throughout the world. There is convergence. US research
universities are perhaps a bit ahead of the curve in some aspects – like
differential fees, different salaries for different faculty, entrepreneurial funding
schemes for capital outlays etc. – but it does seem to be a curve and one sees
their relevancy or emergence in most parts of the world.
There is, I suspect, much more commonality and convergence than growing
differences in organizational behavior. But one might speculate that the causes
are somewhat different. One cause globally is the quest of ministries to create
so-called “world class universities”, focused largely on ranking systems that rely
on citation indices, patents and licenses, and reputational surveys. The push for
improved rankings by ministries, along with their desire for greater
differentiation of institutional missions of their network on national universities,
are changing behaviors of faculty and academic leaders. The establishment of
quality assurance offices and staff, and matrices to judge the performance of
faculty and departments, within universities throughout the globe attest to such
changing behaviors.
Finally, if we view the process of privatization and increased fragmentation
of resources as the result of a rational response of the academy, and specifically
of research universities, to a more market oriented environment, then arguably
what I describe as Devolution is in fact some sort of evolutionary process.
Either way, one must assume it is not a process yet completed. It might mean,
for example, that despite the tricky problems posed by tenure, some sub-set of
academic programs may appear increasingly as expendable; that faculty salaries
will become increasingly differentiated; that the profit and loss centers, and
prestige faculty and departments, will become more pronounced. It means that
the idea of the comprehensive university, with a broad array of disciplines, and
with quality across the board, will be an increasingly rare or at least difficult to
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achieve commodity. But that is only speculation. Universities have been
extremely robust institutions over time, adapting to societal pressures and
funding changes. Devolution may be simply another phase that alters but does
not fundamentally change core practices and missions. That is speculation as
well.
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